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UPDATING  THE  FEDERAL  AGENCY
ENFORCEMENT  PLAYBOOK
Aiste Zalepuga*
INTRODUCTION
Multinational technology companies—including Amazon, Apple,
Facebook, and Google—are leading news headlines for potentially anticom-
petitive behavior.1  If anticompetitive behavior is found, then agencies may
seek and courts will craft an appropriate remedy for the harm.2  Remedies
can be legal or equitable.  While legal remedies tend to be formulaic, equita-
ble remedies allow for significantly more discretion and creativity—providing
the wielder of equity with a powerful tool against defendants.3  The proposed
remedies for “Big Tech” are far ranging and include equitable monetary
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2022; M.Sc., University of
Oxford, 2017; B.A., Yale University, 2016.  I thank Professor Samuel Bray and Professor
Jeffrey Pojanowski for their guidance and instruction.  I also thank Andrew Bond, Geoff
Cebula, Boguse Ganciniauskiene, Zach Pohlman, Fred van Hasselt, Indre Zalepuga, my
parents, and the staff of Volume 96 of the Notre Dame Law Review for their support and
dedication.  All errors are my own.
1 See, e.g., Shirin Ghaffary & Jason Del Rey, The Big Tech Antitrust Report Has One Big
Conclusion: Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google Are Anti-Competitive, VOX (Oct. 6, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/10/6/21505027/congress-big-tech-antitrust-report-
facebook-google-amazon-apple-mark-zuckerberg-jeff-bezos-tim-cook.
2 For instance, in the prominent antitrust case United States v. Microsoft Corp., the dis-
trict court ordered a breakup of Microsoft, the appellate court sought a lesser antitrust
remedy, and Microsoft ultimately settled with the government by allowing greater third-
party interoperability with its products.  253 F.3d 34, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Stipulation of
Settlement, United States v. Microsoft, No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Nov. 6, 2001).  Critics on both
sides continue to question the effectiveness of the remedy prescribed to restore competi-
tion. See, e.g., David Balto, Returning to the Elman Vision of the Federal Trade Commission:
Reassessing the Approach to FTC Remedies, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1113, 1116 (2005); Kenneth G.
Elzinga, David S. Evans & Albert L. Nichols, United States v. Microsoft: Remedy or Malady?, 9
GEO. MASON L. REV. 633, 634 (2001).
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1 (AM. L. INST.
2011).
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relief, such as disgorgement and restitution.4  Selecting one remedy over
another could reshape industries and tangibly impact our daily lives.5
The relationship between courts and agencies plays an important role in
the assignment of remedies.  The “classic vision of lawmaking” focuses on a
bill that becomes a law; however, the interpretation and implementation of
statutes by courts and agencies provide most of the detail in federal law.6
Recent federal court cases suggest a new trend in the relationship between
courts and agencies when interpreting statutes.  Federal courts appear to be
sharpening the distinction between law and equity when interpreting stat-
utes, in order to limit agency enforcement powers.
Recent federal court cases concerning the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) demonstrate this
new relationship between the courts’ insistence on equitable principles and
the agencies’ enforcement powers.  For instance, in Liu v. SEC,7 the Supreme
Court limited SEC enforcement powers by holding the agency accountable to
traditional principles of equity,8 and similar implications arose for the FTC.
In this respect, the FTC provides an interesting case study: the FTC’s use of
equitable remedies grew into a powerful tool to secure some of the agency’s
most significant settlements,9 until federal courts stepped in to limit the
FTC’s arsenal of equitable remedies. For example, the Court unanimously
4 See, e.g., Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act of 2021, S. 225,
117th Cong. § 2(a) (2021) (listing remedies such as behavioral relief, structural relief, civil
penalties, private damages, and equitable monetary relief).
5 See, e.g., Stacking the Tech: Has Google Harmed Competition in Online Advertising?: Hear-
ing Before the S. Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Pol’y, and Consumer Rts., 116th Cong.
2:39:53 (2020) (statements of David Dinielli, Adam Heimlich, Carl Szabo) (responding to
Senator Amy Klobuchar’s question: “What do you think would be the best way to fix
[anticompetitive behavior]?”), https://www.c-span.org/video/?475763-1/google-search-
function-competition.  The proposed remedies cover great range. Id.
6 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION & REGULATION 2 (3d ed.
2017).
7 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1955–56 (2020) (outlining three limiting principles on
the SEC’s use of disgorgement).
8 Congress amended section 21(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to codify
the SEC’s power to obtain disgorgement.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, § 6501, 134 Stat. 3388 (2021).  Congress passed the amend-
ment in January 2021 as a direct response to Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020), and Kokesh
v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017). Id.  The amendment “leave[s] open several questions,
including the extent to which the new statutory disgorgement framework supplants the
requirements for disgorgement outlined in Liu.”  Matthew T. Martens et al., Congress
Amends Exchange Act, Expanding SEC Enforcement Power, WILMERHALE (Jan. 4, 2021), https://
www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20210104-congress-amends-exchange-act-
expanding-sec-enforcement-power.
9 For example, in the FTC’s appellate brief for FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d
147 (3d Cir. 2019), the FTC noted that section 13(b) was key to resolving the Volkswagen
emissions scandal, in which the FTC secured an over $8 billion settlement.  In Shire, the
district court limited the FTC’s use of section 13(b) in such a way that the FTC’s appellate
brief acknowledged would preclude the FTC from obtaining the same relief if the Volk-
swagen litigation were to happen today.  Brief of the Federal Trade Commission and
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curtailed section 13(b) of the FTC Act10 in AMG Capital Management, LLC v.
FTC,11 returning the remedy in question to a traditional equitable category.
Section 13(b) expressly authorizes the FTC to seek permanent injunc-
tions, but other equitable remedies—namely disgorgement and restitution—
are not mentioned.12  Nevertheless, the FTC has read section 13(b) in an
increasingly expansive manner over the past four decades to secure large
monetary remedies.13  While the FTC’s expansive use of section 13(b) has
long been in debate,14 a circuit split recently occurred: the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a broad reading of section 13(b), while the Third and Seventh Cir-
cuits overruled longstanding precedent by holding that the FTC cannot
obtain monetary relief under section 13(b).  Against the backdrop of this
circuit split, the Supreme Court decided the future of section 13(b) in AMG
Capital, holding that the express right to obtain an injunction does not pro-
vide the FTC with the authority to obtain monetary relief.15  The Court’s
interpretation of the FTC Act is instructive to the interpretation of other stat-
utes, as the Court generally is applying an increasingly textualist approach to
statutory interpretation.16
This Note explores the relationship between equitable remedies and
agency enforcement powers, arguing that federal courts are increasingly dis-
tinguishing between law and equity in remedies to impose limits on agency
enforcement powers.  Part I tracks factors driving the FTC’s broad reading of
section 13(b) until AMG Capital.17  Part II analyzes developments in the SEC
with a focus on Liu and suggest that federal courts are returning to tradi-
tional categories of equitable remedies.  Part III concludes with two trends in
determining the scope of agency enforcement powers.  First, federal courts
Appendix Volume 1 (Pages A1–A 16) at 36–37, Shire ViroPharma, 917 F.3d 147 (No. 18-
1807), 2018 WL 3103438, at *36–37.
10 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).
11 141 S. Ct. 1341 (2021) (holding that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable
monetary relief).
12 Section 19 of the FTC Act also allows the FTC to obtain equitable restitution.  How-
ever, this provision is less popular because the agency must first meet other requirements
to invoke equitable restitution, creating a more complicated process than that required by
section 13(b). See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission
Act: Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1142–44 (1992).
13 Balto, supra note 2, at 1113–14.
14 Cf. Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30
STAN. L. REV. 661, 661 (1978).
15 AMG Capital, 141 S. Ct. 1341.
16 See Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 265 & n.1 (2020).
17 See also the FTC’s request to Congress to codify the agency’s interpretation of sec-
tion 13(b) to include monetary relief. Letter from Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, FTC, Noah
Joshua Philips, Comm’r, FTC, Rohit Chorpa, Comm’r, FTC, Rebecca Kelly Slaughter,
Comm’r FTC & Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, FTC, to Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman,
Comm. on Energy & Com., Greg Walden, Ranking Member, Comm. on Energy & Com.,
Roger Wicker, Chairman, Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp. & Marie Cantwell, Ranking
Member, Comm. on Com., Sci. & Transp. (Oct. 22, 2020) [hereinafter FTC Letter to
Chairmen].
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are requiring agencies to show that their use of equitable remedies conforms
with traditional principles of equity.  And second, the reading of statutes in
light of traditional equitable principles restrains agency overreach while pre-
serving the administrative state, reflecting a “neoclassical”18 approach to
administrative law.
I. EVOLUTION OF FTC ENFORCEMENT POWERS
Part I provides an overview of FTC enforcement powers and tracks the
evolution of section 13(b) of the FTC Act.  Section I.A looks at the introduc-
tion of section 13(b) and the use of disgorgement in consumer protection
and competition cases.  Section I.B traces the FTC’s growing reliance on sec-
tion 13(b) in the past forty years, with an inflection point in 2012 when the
FTC started reading section 13(b) even more broadly and began seeking
equitable monetary remedies in more antitrust cases.19  Section I.C assesses
recent federal court cases that created circuit splits and overturned long-
standing precedent to cabin the FTC’s discretion in pursuing equitable mon-
etary relief.
A. Introduction to Equitable Remedies
The distinction between equitable and legal remedies carries important
consequences.20  This distinction originated from the different courts that
emerged in England, which set the stage for the modern remedies toolkit.21
Equity courts developed to provide adequate relief in the cases where courts
of law failed to do so.22  Equitable relief was more difficult to obtain than a
legal remedy because equitable relief required a showing of no adequate
remedy at law.23  Although the courts of law and equity have largely merged,
18 See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 884
(2020).  This Note draws on the understanding of “neoclassical” provided in Pojanowski’s
framework for administrative law to describe the federal courts’ response to agency over-
reach.  The neoclassical alternative:
identifies and offers a tentative defense of an approach that returns to a more
formalist, classical understanding of law and its supremacy.  This approach
accounts for, and embraces, much of the recent criticism of administrative law
doctrine, while also explaining why those worries need not entail that courts
police the details of regulatory policy or single-handedly undo the administrative
state Congress has constructed.
Id. at 856–57.
19 Gerald A. Stein, Understanding the FTC’s Monetary Equitable Remedies Under Section
13(b) for Antitrust Violations, 34 ANTITRUST 59, 59 (2019).
20 Samuel L. Bray, The System of Equitable Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 530, 544–50
(2016).
21 R.P. MEAGHER, W.M.C. GUMMOW & J.R.F. LEHANE, EQUITY DOCTRINES AND REMEDIES
3–69 (3d ed. 1992).
22 See generally SIR JOHN BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 105–24
(5th ed 2019) (tracing the historical development of the Court of Chancery and equity).
23 Id.
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this division still pervades the modern system of remedies.24  Among other
functions, the law-equity distinction in remedies acts as a safeguard against
opportunism and an overbroad reading of what constitutes an equitable rem-
edy.25  Equitable remedies are relevant to determining the scope of agency
enforcement powers because classifying a remedy as equitable triggers “spe-
cial doctrines” that agencies must conform to.26
The FTC Act lays the foundation for the agency’s enforcement powers.
For brief background, the FTC’s law enforcement authority27 covers con-
sumer protection and antitrust laws.28  After the FTC completes an investiga-
tion, the agency can seek an enforcement action using an administrative or
judicial process.29  Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to seek
preliminary and permanent injunctions—subcategories of equitable reme-
dies—in judicial proceedings.  The FTC broadly construes its equitable pow-
ers under section 13(b).  In consumer protection cases, the FTC can seek a
permanent injunction to block unfair or deceptive practices, impose mone-
tary equitable relief to address past violations, and obtain preliminary injunc-
tions or temporary restraining orders to freeze assets so that monetary
equitable relief can be obtained at a later date.30  In antitrust cases, the FTC
typically seeks preliminary injunctions to halt mergers or acquisitions while
FTC administrative proceedings are pending.31  The FTC also has used sec-
tion 13(b) to obtain other equitable remedies that are not explicitly men-
tioned in the statute, including disgorgement and restitution.32
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act increased agency enforcement powers by
authorizing the FTC to seek and obtain permanent injunctions.33  Congress
introduced section 13(b) in 1973 as a response to the perception of the
FTC’s limited authority to go after anticompetitive mergers.34  Although sec-
tion 13(b) was added in the context of competition cases, the FTC began
using section 13(b) for consumer protection cases as a hook to obtain mone-
tary equitable remedies.35  In 1975, Congress amended the FTC Act, adding
24 For instance, suits in equity do not come with a right to a jury trial. See U.S. CONST.
amend. VII.
25 Bray, supra note 20, at 553–58, 563–72.
26 Id. at 544–45 (providing a list of such special doctrines).
27 The FTC holds investigative, law enforcement, and rulemaking authority. See gener-
ally John B. Daish, The Federal Trade Commission, 24 YALE L.J. 43, 49 (1914–1915).
28 A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative, Law Enforcement, and
Rulemaking Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/
enforcement-authority (last updated Oct. 2019).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.; see, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 3d 433, 437–41 (E.D. Pa. 2015);
FTC v. Mylan Lab’ys, Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 35–37 (D.D.C. 1999).
33 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018).
34 J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Striking the Proper Balance: Redress Under
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 3 (2013).
35 Id. at 4.
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monetary relief to the FTC’s enforcement toolkit to help the agency combat
fraud in consumer protection cases.36  In addition, Congress allowed the
FTC to obtain monetary relief but limited this power to two specific condi-
tions, provided in section 1937 and section 5(m)(1)(B).38  However, both sec-
tions failed to combat fraud, due to the inability of courts to order redress
before the money was out of reach.39  The FTC needed a workaround to
freeze the assets in time, so the agency returned to section 13(b).
B. Growing Reliance on Equitable Remedies
The use of section 13(b) to obtain equitable remedies (including dis-
gorgement and restitution) has turned into a powerful tool to secure some of
the FTC’s most significant settlements.  In particular, FTC v. H.N. Singer,
Inc.40 and the withdrawal of the agency’s internal policy guidance contrib-
uted to section 13(b)’s development into such a powerful tool. Singer broad-
ened FTC enforcement powers, greatly expanding the scope of equitable
relief.  In Singer, the Ninth Circuit accepted the FTC’s argument that because
section 13(b) permits permanent injunctions, the statute also “by implication
gives the court authority to afford all necessary ancillary relief,” including
restitution.41  Indeed, the Singer court held that section 13(b) provides the
authority “to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete jus-
tice.”42  Such authority is not expressly provided in section 13(b), but the
Ninth Circuit allowed the FTC to successfully argue that the statute provides
this authority by implication.
The withdrawal of the FTC’s internal policy guidance—the 2003 Policy
Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases (“MER
Policy Statement”)—in 2012 marked another expansion of the agency’s
enforcement powers through section 13(b).43  While the MER Policy State-
36 Id. at 2.
37 Id. (explaining that this section allows the agency “to seek consumer redress in fed-
eral court after an administrative proceeding to determine whether a violation had
occurred, but only for practices that a reasonable person would have known were ‘dishon-
est or fraudulent’” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 57b (2018))).
38 Id. (explaining that this section allows the FTC “to obtain civil penalties when a
company engaged in an act or practice that the Commission had previously determined, in
a litigated proceeding, was unfair or deceptive, but again only if the company had actual
knowledge of that determination”).  See also FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra’s recently
released paper arguing to “resurrect one of the key authorities abandoned in the 1980s:
Section 5(m)(1)(B) of the FTC Act, the Penalty Offense Authority.”  Rohit Chopra &
Samuel A.A. Levine, The Case for Resurrecting the FTC Act’s Penalty Offense Authority, 170 U. PA.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3721256.
39 Id.
40 668 F.2d 1107 (9th Cir. 1982).
41 Id. at 1112.
42 Id. at 1113.
43 Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed.
Reg. 45,820 (Aug. 4, 2003); Withdrawal of the Commission Policy Statement on Monetary
Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,070 (Aug. 7, 2012).  Former
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ment was in effect, disgorgement was not a “routine” remedy for antitrust
cases.44  The agency only sought disgorgement and restitution in “excep-
tional” competition cases.45  And when the FTC did deem a case “excep-
tional,” the agency followed three guiding factors: “(1) whether ‘the
underlying violation is clear’; (2) whether there is a ‘reasonable basis for cal-
culating the amount of the remedial payment’; and (3) ‘the value of seeking
monetary relief’ as compared to ‘any other remedies available,’ including pri-
vate actions and criminal proceedings.”46  The FTC only brought two cases
under section 13(b) while the MER Policy Statement was in effect for nine
years.47  Following the withdrawal of the MER Policy Statement, the FTC
brought more cases—six in six years.48
The FTC justified the withdrawal of the MER Policy Statement and its
increased reliance on section 13(b),49 but others voiced concern.  Upon
withdrawing the statement, the FTC noted that the MER Policy Statement
“create[d] an overly restrictive view of the Commission’s options for equita-
ble remedies.”50  In addition, the FTC stated that the MER Policy Statement
“chilled the pursuit of monetary remedies,” and that the agency’s
“prosecutorial discretion” was sufficient to decide when disgorgement was
appropriate.51  The FTC rejected the MER Policy Statement’s three guiding
principles, reasoning: the first and second factors were not needed because
the “rarity or clarity of the violation is not an element considered by the
courts in disgorgement requests,” and therefore the FTC did not need a
Acting Chairman Maureen Ohlhausen dissented from the decision to withdraw the state-
ment. See id. at 47,071 (Statement of Commissioner Ohlhausen, Dissenting from the Deci-
sion to Withdraw (July 31, 2012)).  Ohlhausen later explained that the lack of policy
guidance created “a dramatic uptick in the agency’s pursuit of monetary equitable relief.”
MAUREEN K. OHLHAUSEN, COMM’R, FED. TRADE COMM’N., DOLLARS, DOCTRINE, AND DAMAGE
CONTROL: HOW DISGORGEMENT AFFECTS THE FTC’S ANTITRUST MISSION 1 (2016).
44 Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 45,821.
45 Id. (explaining that if the case was not “exceptional,” then the agency “rel[ied]
primarily on more familiar, prospective remedies”).
46 Stein, supra note 19, at 60 (quoting Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Reme-
dies in Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,821).
47 Id.  Stein divides the FTC’s history of enforcement powers into three time periods
based on this policy statement: “(1) from 1973 to the 2003 Policy Statement; (2) from the
2003 Policy Statement to the 2012 Withdrawal; and (3) post-2012 Withdrawal.” Id.  During
the first time period (1973–2003), the FTC only brought two actions for equitable reme-
dies. Id.
48 Id.
49 Notice of Withdrawal of Commission Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Rem-
edies in Competition Cases, 77 Fed. Reg. at 47,070 (Aug. 7, 2012) (Statement of the Com-
mission (July 13, 2012)).
50 Id. at 47,070.  The FTC continued: “while disgorgement and restitution are not
appropriate in all [antitrust] cases, we do not believe they should apply only in ‘excep-
tional cases.’” Id. at 47,071 (quoting Policy Statement on Monetary Equitable Remedies in
Competition Cases, 68 Fed. Reg. at 45,821).
51 Id.
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“heightened standard for disgorgement” in antitrust cases.52  The third fac-
tor also was not needed, according to the FTC, because “whether there are
alternative plaintiffs that may seek or are seeking monetary relief is relevant
in this context, but it is not dispositive.”53  Many critiqued the withdrawal of
the MER Policy Statement, including FTC Commissioner Ohlhausen who
warned that the withdrawal could lead the FTC to seek disgorgement in cases
where it is not actually merited.54  This concern served as an accurate predic-
tion, as federal courts stepped in to limit FTC enforcement powers.
C. Court-Imposed Limits on Equitable Remedies
The FTC’s reliance on such broad enforcement powers was largely
unquestioned until 2019.  Recent federal court cases mark this shift.  First, in
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., the Third Circuit limited a timing element
related to section 13(b).55  Prior to Shire, the FTC could seek equitable mon-
etary remedies whether there was an ongoing, pending, or stale violation to
satisfy section 13(b)’s “about to violate the law” requirement. Shire limited
this to only ongoing or impending violations.56  Specifically, since the FTC
waited about five years after Shire’s wrongful conduct ceased to file a com-
plaint, the court held that the defendant was not violating the law when the
FTC brought an action.57  FTC commissioners argued that the court’s inter-
pretation was overly restrictive because the agency could no longer remedy
past harms, nor obtain injunctions in situations where there was a reasonable
likelihood that the defendant would resume such violations.58  On balance,
this decision does not only limit the cases that the FTC can bring in the first
place, but the decision will also likely impede upon FTC enforcement powers
by placing the FTC in a weaker bargaining position when seeking settlements
with defendants.59 Shire set the stage for federal courts to start limiting the
FTC’s interpretation of section 13(b).
Second, FTC v. AbbVie Inc. further limited the FTC’s interpretation of
section 13(b).  The Third Circuit held that section 13(b) does not authorize
disgorgement as a remedy, reversing the district court’s disgorgement pen-
alty of $448 million.60  The court noted: “Injunctive relief constitutes a dis-
tinct type of equitable relief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at (Statement of Commissioner Ohlhausen, Dissenting from the Decision to
Withdraw (July 31, 2012)).
55 917 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019).  This case concerns antitrust violations, but the holding
of the case applies to consumer protection cases as well.
56 Id. at 159.
57 Id. at 160.
58 FTC Letter to Chairmen, supra note 17.
59 Id. For instance, defendants may be less motivated to enter a settlement with the
FTC, since simply pausing an unlawful activity may allow the defendant to circumvent the
FTC. Id.
60 FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 374 (3d Cir. 2020).
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restitution or disgorgement.”61  The court also stated that disgorgement
“deprives a wrongdoer of past gains,” whereas injunctions are forward-look-
ing.62  Thus, allowing disgorgement would be inconsistent with the “about to
violate the law” requirement that was affirmed in Shire. AbbVie limited the
FTC’s interpretation of section 13(b) by stating that a subcategory of equita-
ble relief (injunctive relief) does not imply other subcategories of equitable
relief (restitution and disgorgement).
Third, in FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, the Seventh Circuit issued an
opinion consistent with AbbVie, holding that the FTC cannot seek restitution
from defendants in federal court under section 13(b).63  Although section
13(b) expressly authorizes the FTC to seek a permanent injunction, there is
no mention of monetary relief.  Nevertheless, courts had previously read
“injunctions” broadly in section 13(b) to imply other equitable remedies,
such as restitution and disgorgement for monetary relief.64  The Seventh Cir-
cuit overturned its precedent, explaining that an “implied restitution remedy
doesn’t sit comfortably with the text of section 13(b).”65  In particular, the
Seventh Circuit highlighted Supreme Court precedent, noting the Court’s
instruction to “consider whether an implied equitable remedy is compatible
with a statute’s express remedial scheme” and “not to assume that a statute
with ‘elaborate enforcement provisions’ implicitly authorizes other reme-
dies.”66  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit stated that the FTC Act does con-
tain remedial provisions that explicitly reference restitution; however, section
13(b) does not explicitly reference such remedial provisions and, thus, read-
ing an implied restitution would make the other provisions “largely point-
less.”67  The Seventh Circuit, therefore, applied a stricter textualist
interpretation to section 13(b) and overturned its own longstanding
precedent.68
As a result, the Seventh Circuit in Credit Bureau Center, along with the
Third Circuit in AbbVie, created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit that was
61 Id. at 376 (quoting Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Landstar Sys., Inc., 622
F.3d 1307, 1324 (11th Cir. 2010)).
62 Id.
63 FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 783 (7th Cir. 2019).
64 Many courts supported this broad implied reading from the Supreme Court’s 1946
decision in Porter v. Warner Holding Co., which held that a different federal statute’s express
mention of “permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order”
allowed district courts to use “all . . . inherent equitable powers,” including monetary reme-
dies like restitution.  328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946) (quoting Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942, ch. 26, § 205(a), 56 Stat. 23, 33); see also U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh FTC Restitution
Authority, GIBSON DUNN (July 13, 2020), https://www.gibsondunn.com/us-supreme-court-
to-weigh-ftc-restitution-authority/.
65 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 772.
66 Id. at 767 (quoting Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 487 (1996)).
67 Id. at 774.
68 See Statutory Interpretation—Stare Decisis—Seventh Circuit Uses Methodological Stare Decisis
to Reverse Substantive Precedent—FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (7th Cir.
2019), 133 HARV. L. REV. 1444, 1444 (2020).
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addressed by the Supreme Court in AMG Capital.69  In 2018, the Ninth Cir-
cuit in AMG Capital held the opposite of Credit Bureau Center: section 13(b)
does authorize monetary relief.70  Following the Court’s grant of certiorari,
FTC General Counsel Alden F. Abbott issued a statement of confidence in
the FTC’s expansive reading of section 13(b).71  However, others expressed
concern.72  Such concern was rightly placed. In 2021, the AMG Capital Court
unanimously held that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary
relief, reasoning that “to read those words as allowing what they do not say”
would result in “read[ing] the words as going well beyond the provision’s
subject matter.”73 Indeed, “that reading would allow a small statutory tail to
wag a very large dog.”74 Thus, the Court limited the agency’s interpretation
of injunctions by realigning the remedy with traditional equitable categories.
II. RETURNING TO TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES
Part II assesses the Supreme Court’s review of SEC enforcement powers,
which serves as an indicator of the likely review that other agencies may
undergo.  Section II.A analyzes the Court’s recent decision in Liu, arguing
that both the majority and dissent indicate a return to traditional categories
of equity.  Section II.B draws on that analysis to assess the application of Liu’s
reasoning in AMG Capital and the implications for agency enforcement
powers.
A. Protean Character of Disgorgement
The Securities Exchange Act (“Exchange Act”) authorizes SEC enforce-
ment powers.  One year after its enactment, the statute was amended to “pun-
ish securities fraud through administrative and civil proceedings.”75
69 The Supreme Court consolidated Credit Bureau Center with AMG Capital in the sum-
mer of 2020 to address whether the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to seek restitution.  How-
ever, the Court took back the grant of certiorari from Credit Bureau Center.  See Credit Bureau
Ctr., 937 F.3d 764, cert. vacated, 141 S. Ct. 194 (2020).
70 AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417, 427–28 (9th Cir. 2018).
71 Peter Kaplan, Statement of FTC General Counsel Alden F. Abbott Regarding Supreme Court
Orders Granting Review of Two FTC Matters, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 9, 2020), https://
www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/07/statement-ftc-general-counsel-abbott-
regarding-supreme-court.  “We look forward to proving to the Supreme Court that the FTC
Act empowers us to fully protect consumers by ensuring that money unlawfully taken from
them is rightfully returned.” Id.
72 Oral Statement of FTC Comm’r Christine S. Wilson Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Com.
Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Com., 116th Cong. (May 8, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_statements/1519254/commissioner_wilson_may_
2019_ec_opening.pdf. Following the Liu decision discussed in Part II, the FTC commis-
sioners even coauthored a letter to Congress, asking for legislation that would “restore
Section 13(b) to the way it has operated for four decades.” FTC Letter to Chairmen, supra
note 17, at 4.
73 AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC v. FTC, 141 S. Ct. 1341, 1348 (2021).
74 Id.
75 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020).
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Accordingly, the SEC’s statutory framework distinguishes between adminis-
trative and civil proceedings.76  In administrative proceedings, the Exchange
Act authorizes the SEC to specifically seek “disgorgement” according to 15
U.S.C. § 77h-1(e).  However, in civil proceedings, the Exchange Act broadly
authorizes the SEC to seek “equitable relief,” according to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(5).  Although no statute authorizes the SEC to seek disgorgement
in civil proceedings, disgorgement has been one of the SEC’s most powerful
enforcement tools,77 and the SEC has frequently relied on disgorgement in
enforcement cases.  For instance, just over the course of one year, the SEC
obtained $1.101 billion in civil penalties—and about triple that amount in
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.78  Recently, however, SEC disgorgement has
been called into question.  Congress had not defined “equitable relief,” and
recent cases have considered whether and in what form “disgorgement” may
be permitted by “equitable relief” in judicial proceedings.
The guiding inquiry for what constitutes “equitable relief” is whether the
remedy in question falls into “those categories of relief that were typically
available in equity.”79  More specifically, to determine the particular rem-
edy’s “availab[ility] in equity,” courts look at the remedies that were available
“before law and equity merged,” in the days of “the divided bench.”80  In
other words, the question is whether a particular remedy is one “traditionally
viewed as ‘equitable.’”81  Equity can sweep in a wide breadth of remedies;
thus, the interpretation of “equitable relief” as including only traditional
equitable remedies serves as a safeguard against the flexibility within equity.
While the doctrine of equity evolves with time, the requirement of traditional
equitable remedies prevents courts from improvising to the point of arbitrari-
ness in the name of fairness, or from indulging in a “freewheeling power” to
create new equitable remedies.82  The Court’s emphasis on traditional equi-
table remedies indicates that the Court “decisively rejected an alternative—
and far broader and more malleable—understanding of the term.”83  In
addition, the Court’s narrow inquiry when interpreting “equitable relief” in
the Exchange Act reflects Congress’s use of “equitable relief” as an “unmis-
76 See generally Comment, Equitable Remedies in SEC Enforcement Actions, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1188 (1975).
77 See generally Greg Andres, Robert Cohen & Paul Nathanson, Supreme Court Review of
SEC’s Authority to Seek Disgorgement, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Nov. 21, 2019),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/11/21/supreme-court-review-of-secs-authority-to-
seek-disgorgement/ (noting that disgorgement is the “SEC’s largest financial remedy”).
78 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT: 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 16
(2019).
79 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1942 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256
(1993)).
80 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 4, Liu, 140 S. Ct.
1936 (No. 18-1501), 2019 WL 7209871, at *4 (quoting U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 569
U.S. 88, 94–95 (2013)).
81 Id. at 4 (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 255).
82 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
83 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 5.
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takably technical term[ ].”84  Therefore, the analysis of whether the SEC’s
authorizing statute permits a certain remedy turns on whether that particular
remedy can be classified as a traditional equitable remedy.
Scholars and practitioners disagree on disgorgement’s definition and
roots, and the history of SEC disgorgement reflects many of these different
characterizations.85  Such different characterizations of disgorgement
include: a profits-recovery principle that is a feature of different equitable
remedies, a parallel remedy to accounting for profits, a synonym for restitu-
tion, an umbrella term for equitable restitution remedies, and a distinct equi-
table remedy.86  Disgorgement, in essence, deprives wrongdoers of their
gains from unlawful activity so that wrongdoers do not benefit from their
wrongdoing.87  This profits-recovery principle harkens back to equity courts
and has gone by different names throughout history,88 including accounting
for profits89 and restitution.90  Pre-1938 patent cases sought “accounting,”
which the Court “described as an equitable remedy requiring disgorgement
of ill-gotten profits.”91  Although the petitioners in Liu tried to distinguish
accounting from disgorgement by claiming that accounting requires a
breach of trust or fiduciary duty, the Court made clear that equity courts did
84 Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1014
(2015).
85 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is not even clear what ‘dis-
gorgement’ means.”).  The term “disgorgement” only started appearing in legal publica-
tions, such as dictionaries and restatements, in the twentieth century. Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. L. INST.
2011) (“[T]he unjust enrichment of a conscious wrongdoer, or of a defaulting fiduciary
without regard to notice or fault, is the net profit attributable to the underlying wrong.
The object of restitution in such cases is to eliminate profit from wrongdoing while avoid-
ing, so far as possible, the imposition of a penalty.  Restitution remedies that pursue this
object are often called ‘disgorgement’ or ‘accounting.’”).  This suggests synonymy between
disgorgement and accounting. But see Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of
Petitioners, supra note 80, at 21 n.11 (“[T]here is no systematic attempt in Chapter 7 [of
the aforementioned Restatement] to distinguish with precision the legal and equitable
aspects of the various remedies described.” (first alteration in original) (quoting RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 4 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2011))).
86 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, 1 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
(2d ed. 1993); 2 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1993);
DAN B. DOBBS, 3 DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1993).
87 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1943 (citing Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 207 (1882)).
88 Brief of Remedies and Restitution Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Side at 25–26, Liu, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (No. 18-1501), 2019 WL 7372925, at *25–26 (arguing
that disgorgement has a history to equity courts because “accounting for profits was an
equitable remedy to recover the gains from wrongful acts, and a general grant of equitable
jurisdiction authorized courts to award it”).
89 “Accounting for profits” is also sometimes referred to as “accounting.”
90 1 DOBBS, supra note 86, § 4.3(5), at 611.
91 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1944 (citing SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag v. First Quality Baby
Prods., LLC, 137 S. Ct. 954, 964 (2017)).
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not require such trust or relationship92—affirming parallels between
accounting and disgorgement.93  In 1971, the SEC started pursuing “restitu-
tion” to “depriv[e]” a wrongdoer of “the gains of . . . wrongful conduct,”94
and the SEC rebranded “restitution” to “disgorgement” in the 1970s95—sug-
gesting the synonymy of “restitution” and “disgorgement” at that time.96
Therefore, although accounting for profits and restitution are terms that
existed in equity courts, “disgorgement” appeared as a new term in remedies
just in the second half of the twentieth century.97  This new term (disgorge-
ment) started replacing the established terms (accounting for profits and res-
titution) in SEC actions.
SEC disgorgement assumed a “protean character,”98 as the agency
increasingly departed from the equitable principles underlying the estab-
lished terms.99  What is in a name?100  The “novelty of the term introduce[d]
conceptual space” between traditional equitable remedies and the SEC’s new
remedy.101  Such conceptual space allowed the SEC to justify proceeds of
fraud going to the government instead of the victims,102 or to blur the law-
equity distinction because disgorgement had no direct historical ties to either
the court of law or equity.103  The SEC’s “protean” version of disgorgement
grew into a powerful remedial tool,104 as the SEC used disgorgement as a
92 Id. (“Contrary to petitioners’ argument, equity courts did not limit this remedy to
cases involving a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty.”).
93 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. L.
INST. 2011) (“Restitution remedies” that seek “to eliminate profit from wrongdoing . . .  are
often called ‘disgorgement’ or ‘accounting.’”).
94 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940, 1952 (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971)).
95 See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).
96 Agencies started referring to “disgorgement” as a remedy in the 1960s. See NLRB v.
Loc. 176, 276 F.2d 583, 586 (1st Cir. 1960) (describing disgorgement as the “remedy of
disgorgement of dues”).
97 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 22;
George P. Roach, A Default Rule of Omnipotence: Implied Jurisdiction and Exaggerated Remedies
in Equity for Federal Agencies, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 49 (2007). But see Brief of
Remedies and Restitution Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Side, supra note
88, at 4 (noting that although SEC disgorgement is a relatively new term, disgorgement
generally has long equity roots).
98 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663,
668 n.1 (2014)).
99 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 25
(noting that the agency’s use of new, instead of established, terminology “press[ed] a fuzzy
and non-technical term into service at the expense of a number of more precise and tech-
nical terms with well-understood legal meanings”).
100 See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, l. 43.
101 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at
22–23.
102 Id. at 23.
103 Id.
104 At the height of the SEC’s broad reading of disgorgement in SEC v. Contorinis, 743
F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014), the Second Circuit held that the defendant must disgorge not
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tool to punish wrongdoers and to deter potential wrongdoers from violating
securities laws.105
The SEC used the new term to sidestep the constraints of equity in three
main ways: (1) returning the proceeds of fraud to the government, instead of
the victims; (2) imposing joint and several liability on defendants, instead of
holding defendants individually liable; and (3) refusing to deduct legitimate
expenses from the proceeds of fraud.106  In the SEC’s Liu brief, the SEC
argued that Congress implicitly supports the agency’s use of disgorgement,
even when the agency sidesteps such equitable principles because the SEC’s
authorizing statute explicitly allows “disgorgement” in administrative pro-
ceedings.107  However, the Court noted that the reference to “disgorgement”
in other statutes does “not expand the contours of that term beyond . . . a
limit established by longstanding principles of equity.”108  While the SEC
expanded disgorgement by sidestepping equitable principles, the Liu Court
clarified that the remedy must conform to traditional equitable principles.
B. Disgorgement as a Traditional Equitable Remedy
The Liu Court, following the trend set forth in Kokesh,109 limited SEC
disgorgement, and by extension, the scope of SEC enforcement powers.  In
2017, the Court in Kokesh held that disgorgement functions as a “penalty”—
but only in the context of the applicable statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2462.110  The Kokesh Court provided a narrow holding of its assessment of
disgorgement by refusing to address whether “equitable relief” under section
78u(d)(5) includes disgorgement.111  In 2020, the Court answered this ques-
tion in Liu, holding that “equitable relief” does permit disgorgement.112
However, the Court also limited the scope of disgorgement by setting out
equitable principles that disgorgement must conform to: (1) the proceeds of
fraud must be returned to the victims, rather than the government; (2) joint
and several liability cannot be imposed; and (3) legitimate expenses must be
only his ill-gotten profits, but also “the benefit that accrue[d] to third parties.” Id.  In this
case, disgorgement was “used to recover funds the defendant never had and profits he
never received.”  Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note
80, at 25.
105 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
106 See Liu v. SEC., 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1947–50 (2020).
107 See Brief for the Respondent at 13–21, Liu, 140 S. Ct. 1936 (No. 18-1501), 2020 WL
257572, at *13–21.
108 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1947.
109 See generally Daniel B. Listwa & Charles Seidell, Note, Penalties in Equity: Disgorgement
after Kokesh v. SEC, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 667 (2018).
110 Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1645.
111 See id.; see also Steven Peikin, Co-Dir., Div. of Enf’t, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remedies
and Relief in SEC Enforcement Actions (Oct. 3, 2018) (emphasizing that this decision still
has great impact even with this limited holding, considering that the SEC is unable to seek
about $800 million per year in potential disgorgement cases).
112 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1946.
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deducted from the disgorgement award, defined as net profit of the fraud.113
By adding these three principles, Liu modified SEC disgorgement to con-
form with traditional concepts of equity.
These limits on SEC disgorgement mark a return to traditional catego-
ries of equity.  In particular, the Liu principles indicate a return to traditional
equitable remedies and reinforce a central feature of traditional equitable
remedies: equity does not punish.114  The first limiting principle in Liu—
proceeds of fraud must be returned to victims—is an equitable restitution
remedy called a constructive trust.  Prior to Liu, the proceeds of fraud were
deposited in the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  The SEC defended this
practice by arguing that the purpose of depriving wrongdoers of their profits
is to make sure that wrongdoers do not profit from their illegal activity,
rather than attempt to provide restitution to victims.  However, the SEC stat-
ute specifically limits “equitable relief” to that which “may be appropriate or
necessary for the benefit of investors.”115  Accordingly, the applicable statute
directs the SEC to not only deprive wrongdoers of their profits, but also to
provide restitution to victims—a hallmark of constructive trusts.  A construc-
tive trust applies “when ‘money or property identified as belonging in good
conscience to the plaintiff’ can be ‘traced to particular funds or property in
the defendant’s possession.’”116  Tracing “allows the plaintiff to follow an
asset through changes in form or changes in putative ownership,” which
“grant[s] the plaintiff an interest in particular property that has been wrong-
fully diverted.”117  Therefore, tracing, ensures that the defendant is not pun-
ished.  Overall, the first limiting principle in Liu reinforces the no-
punishment principle of equity and returns SEC disgorgement to a tradi-
tional equitable remedy called a constructive trust.
The second limiting principle in Liu—joint and several liability cannot
be imposed—marks a return to equitable limitations on collective liability.
Prior to Liu, the SEC required all defendants who received ill-gotten profits,
including those who may be jointly and severally liable, to disgorge those
profits.  The prohibition of joint and several liability marks a realignment
with equity courts.  Although the Liu Court did not categorically take away
collective liability,118 the Court did clarify that the remedy should not
impugn multiple defendants simply to punish those defendants.  This princi-
ple reflects a maxim of equity that equity acts in personam.119  Therefore,
113 Id. at 1047–50.
114 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at
8–16.
115 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018).
116 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 18
(quoting Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 213 (2002)).
117 Id.
118 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949 (explaining that even common law may impose liability for
defendants acting in concert and that there is a “wide spectrum of relationships between
participants and beneficiaries of unlawful schemes”).
119 Howard L. Oleck, Maxims of Equity Reappraised, 6 RUTGERS L. REV. 528, 531 (1952).
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the second limiting principle in Liu also reinforces the no-punishment prin-
ciple of equity.
The third limiting principle in Liu—legitimate expenses must be
deducted from the disgorgement award—is characteristic of a traditional res-
titution remedy: accounting for profits.  Prior to Liu, the SEC typically did
not deduct legitimate expenses from the disgorgement award, since such
expenses were used to further illegal conduct.120  However, post-Liu, only
net profit (as opposed to gross receipts) of the fraud can be disgorged, and
legitimate expenses must be deducted from the net profit.121  Moving for-
ward, SEC staff will have to “look behind the numbers and make assessments
relating to . . . what constitutes net profits.”122  This limiting principle func-
tions like accounting for profits, in which the accounting “requires the dis-
loyal trustee to turn over actual net profits to his beneficiary.”123  Further,
“there is a strict ‘no profit’ rule for trustees” because the trustee acts as “a
good trustee . . . is already required to do.”124  Indeed, “accounting does not
punish the wrongdoer.”125  Therefore, the third limiting principle in Liu
similarly reinforces the no-punishment principle of equity and returns SEC
disgorgement to a traditional equitable remedy called accounting for profits.
Although Liu limited SEC disgorgement, the decision was still a
favorable outcome for the SEC.126  The Court could have held that the SEC
does not have authority to seek disgorgement at all in judicial proceedings;
instead, the Court affirmed that SEC disgorgement can be considered an
equitable remedy.  The impact of Liu will depend on how lower courts inter-
pret the three limiting principles on SEC disgorgement.  Each of the three
principles contains areas of ambiguity for lower courts to continue allowing
the SEC to test the bounds of equity: (1) the proceeds of fraud must be
returned to victims—however, the Court does not specify what to do in situa-
tions in which returning the award to the victim is not feasible; (2) joint and
several liability cannot be imposed—however, collective liability remains an
120 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1950 (noting that the district court similarly refused to deduct
expenses based on this theory, and the Supreme Court overruled that decision).
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4) (AM. L.
INST. 2011) (confirming that wrongdoer’s net profits should only be calculated).
122 Veronica E. Callahan et al., Supreme Court Upholds—but Also Limits—SEC Disgorgement
Authority, ARNOLD & PORTER (June 24, 2020), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspec-
tives/publications/2020/06/supreme-court-upholds-sec-disgorgement-authority.  This cal-
culation of net profits “likely will be a factor in settlement negotiations as well as contested
proceedings.” Id.
123 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 17.
124 Id.  The Restatement also makes clear that accounting for profits does not require a
constructive trust. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51 &
cmt. b. (AM. L. INST. 2011).
125 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 17
(“A plaintiff can recover only the defendant’s actual profits—not whatever gross revenues
were derived from the wrongdoing, and not any punitive enhancement.  Thus, the defen-
dant is generally entitled to an offset compensating him for the costs he incurred.”  (cita-
tions omitted)).
126 See U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh FTC Restitution Authority, supra note 64.
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option;127 and (3) legitimate expenses must be deducted from the net profits
of the fraud128—however, there is uncertainty in which expenses might be
sufficiently “wholly fraudulent” to constitute “legitimate” expenses.129  If
lower courts accept arguments based on these areas of ambiguity within the
three limiting principles, the SEC is more likely to retain a remedy that
resembles its pre-Liu version of disgorgement.  In particular, lower courts can
read the areas of ambiguity broadly and continue granting the SEC broad
enforcement powers.  But if lower courts strictly adhere to the limiting princi-
ples and thus close off the areas of ambiguity, courts will effectively remove
SEC disgorgement from the agency’s remedial toolkit—as Justice Thomas
argues for in his dissent in Liu.130
If lower courts fully and consistently apply Liu’s limiting principles on
SEC disgorgement, then disgorgement would effectively function as an
umbrella of existing traditional equitable remedies.  In essence, the traits
that made SEC disgorgement inconsistent with traditional equitable princi-
ples would be rectified.  First, SEC disgorgement was previously criticized for
being a “20th-century invention” without a direct historical lineage to equity
courts;131 however, disgorgement that fully conforms to Liu’s limiting princi-
ples would not have this problem because the limited version of disgorge-
ment would be a conglomeration of traditional equitable remedies, namely
constructive trusts and accounting for profits.  Second, SEC disgorgement
previously did not have “well-understood contours;”132 however, disgorge-
ment that conforms to Liu’s limiting principles would regain structure.
Finally, SEC disgorgement previously violated the no-punishment principle
of equity; however, disgorgement that conforms to Liu’s limiting principles
would abide by the no-punishment rule because of the safeguards within the
three limiting principles.  Before the SEC expanded disgorgement, the rem-
127 See SEC v. Smith, No. 20-1056, 2020 WL 6712257, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020)
(post-Liu case decided by the district court in California, holding in favor of the SEC and
concluding that the “[d]efendants shall be held jointly and severally liable for disgorge-
ment because they acted in concert to perpetrate the fraudulent scheme” in a post-Liu
case).
128 Liu v. SEC: Supreme Court Affirms SEC’s Disgorgement Authority but Imposes Limitations,
WHITE & CASE (June 24, 2020), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/liu-v-sec-
supreme-court-affirms-secs-disgorgement-authority-imposes-limitations (“[D]isgorgement
could be considerably reduced if no net profit was made on the illegal activity, affording
defendants a strong argument for lowering disgorgement amounts.”).
129 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1950 (2020); see also SEC v. Mizrahi, No. 19-2284, 2020
WL 6114913, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 5, 2020) (illustrating the different types of transac-
tions that defendant wanted to include as “legitimate expenses,” in a post-Liu case, but the
district court in California rejected, holding that the SEC correctly calculated net profits
and correctly deducted legitimate expenses).
130 In his dissent in Liu, Justice Thomas argued there should be a clean break and
disgorgement should be categorically removed from the SEC’s remedial toolbox, since dis-
gorgement is not a traditional form of equitable relief.
131 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1951 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
132 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at
19–20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 18 11-MAY-21 9:13
2100 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
edy largely existed in a limited form—merely an “umbrella” of existing tradi-
tional equitable remedies.133  While “this understanding that ‘disgorgement’
was simply an umbrella term ha[d] faded away” for some time,134 Liu sug-
gests the Court is returning to such an understanding of disgorgement.
Overall, the Liu Court affirmed the SEC’s ability to continue seeking
disgorgement, while insisting upon categories of traditional equitable reme-
dies.  The Court’s decision to permit disgorgement, rather than categorically
remove it from the enforcement toolkit, is significant because disgorgement
allows an agency to seek redress on behalf of private plaintiffs, resulting in
the SEC retaining the right to bring the suit in the first place.  At the same
time, Liu’s limiting principles markedly return the Court’s rhetoric to tradi-
tional equitable remedies.  While the scope of SEC disgorgement will ulti-
mately depend on whether lower courts interpret Liu more in line with the
majority or the dissent,135 there seems to be a return in the Court’s reason-
ing toward traditional equitable remedies in both the majority and dissent.
C. Implications for Agency Enforcement Powers
Liu’s implications on agency enforcement powers can already be seen in
the FTC. Liu limits FTC enforcement powers in several ways. Liu’s first limit-
ing principle suggests the FTC will have to reimburse funds to consumers,
rather than continuing its practice of depositing funds with the Treasury.
Liu’s second limiting principle suggests the FTC will no longer be able to
impugn multiple defendants using joint and several liability, marking the end
of a common practice by the FTC.136  And Liu’s third limiting principle over-
turns FTC v. Commerce Planet, Inc., in which the court held that unjust gains
are “measured by the defendant’s net revenues.”137  Moving forward, the
FTC will likely have to measure such ill-gotten profits on net profit.
133 Id. at 24 (explaining that disgorgement is not really a remedy, but rather an
“umbrella term for a number of remedies”).
The disgorgement remedy is effected through the equitable remedies of con-
structive trust, tracing, and accounting; requiring the fiduciary to indemnify the
agent for losses; setting aside an improper transaction or objectionable act; grant-
ing injunctive and declaratory relief; and awarding prejudgment interest.  Each of
these remedies is designed to deprive the fiduciary of all gains resulting from her
wrongful conduct.
Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1051 n.14 (1991).
134 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 24;
see also Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet Remedies, 38 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 71, 87–89 (2018).
135 E.g., SEC v. Janus Spectrum LLC, 811 F. App’x 432, 434 (9th Cir. 2020) (mem.)
(remanding to make sure that the district court walks through all limiting principles).
However, there are not enough cases yet to indicate which way courts will lean.
136 Mark Hopson, Benjamin Mundel & Lucas Croslow, 3 Ways High Court’s Liu v. SEC
Ruling Curtails FTC Authority, SIDLEY (July 14, 2020), https://www.sidley.com/-/media/
publications/law3603-ways-high-courts-liu-v-sec-ruling-curtails-ftc-authority.pdf?la=en.
137 815 F.3d 593, 603 (9th Cir. 2016).
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Furthermore, Liu’s emphasis on traditional equitable principles when
assessing remedies can be seen in AMG Capital.  The SEC statute authorizes a
whole category (equitable relief), whereas the FTC Act only authorizes a sub-
category of equitable relief (injunctions).  This distinction seems key.  In Liu,
the protean nature of disgorgement provided ambiguity that the majority
opinion could have used to continue allowing disgorgement to exist in its
overstretched form or completely remove it from the SEC’s remedial toolkit.
Yet the majority ultimately preserved the SEC’s ability to obtain disgorgement
and tamed disgorgement into a subcategory of equitable relief.  In this
respect, the FTC’s statutory framework for equitable remedies is different
than that of the SEC.  The FTC’s enabling statute only allows the agency to
enforce injunctions, a specific subcategory of equitable remedies.  Previous
courts have read the subcategory of injunction to imply a whole other subcat-
egory of monetary relief.138  However, the Court’s reasoning in Liu and AMG
Capital suggests that such broad powers will no longer be condoned as courts
are holding agency enforcement powers accountable to traditional equitable
categories.
III. TRENDS SHAPING AGENCY ENFORCEMENT POWERS
Drawing on the previous analysis of recent changes in FTC and SEC
enforcement authority, Part III assesses two trends in determining the scope
of agency enforcement powers.  First, courts appear to be using traditional
equitable principles as an interpretive tool to assess the scope of agency
enforcement powers.  And second, the law-equity distinction allows courts to
both curtail agency discretion and preserve the administrative state, reflect-
ing a neoclassical approach to administrative law.
A. Distinction Between Law and Equity
The FTC and SEC cases demonstrate that the law-equity distinction in
remedies remains consequential.  On one hand, law and equity have merged
in most areas of the law, and remedies scholars generally view the distinction
as “outmoded.”139  However, this Note illustrates that the law-equity distinc-
tion in remedies does have analytical value in the present, and that this dis-
tinction captures a unique set of “differences in policy” that are not
necessarily reflected when remedies are divided in different ways, such as
monetary and nonmonetary remedies.140  For instance, the division of reme-
dies into legal and equitable halves reveals a trend toward shaping monetary
remedies to conform with equitable principles.  Further, the law-equity dis-
tinction emphasizes that the agencies here are not asking for the creation of
138 See, e.g., FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d 764, 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2019) (Wood,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that injunctions are broad by definition and can sweep in a num-
ber of ancillary remedies).
139 Bray, supra note 20, at 532, 534 (citing scholars that view the law-equity distinction
as lacking utility and ultimately arguing that the distinction does merit value).
140 Id. at 535 (emphasizing that the law-equity distinction remains important).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-5\NDL513.txt unknown Seq: 20 11-MAY-21 9:13
2102 notre dame law review [vol. 96:5
completely new equitable remedies in district courts—indeed, the agencies
have been seeking and obtaining the equitable remedies in question for at
least thirty years.  Rather, recent SEC and FTC cases demonstrate a new chal-
lenge for agencies to show that the remedies they have been obtaining are, in
fact, allowed as traditional equitable remedies.  Thus, the key question is
whether these remedies can be squared with the courts’ renewed focus on
equity.
To make these remedies consistent with equity, federal courts are clarify-
ing equitable principles.  In Liu, the Supreme Court laid out three principles
to ensure a foundational distinction between law and equity: equity does not
punish.  Expanding upon Kokesh, Liu made clear that agencies cannot
impose penalties when seeking equitable remedies.141  Indeed, the Court’s
limitations on disgorgement brings disgorgement in line with other equitable
restitution remedies that “contain[ ] built-in limitations that are calibrated to
avoid punishing the defendant.”142  Similarly, lower courts have been using
equitable principles to address agency discretion, as demonstrated by the rea-
soning in Shire.143  The Third Circuit’s tightening of the time limit for equita-
ble remedies in Shire reflects an equitable principle of a stricter mootness
requirement.144  Although the Third Circuit did not explicitly call this an
equitable principle like the Court did when clarifying equitable principles in
Liu, the Third Circuit similarly seems to be effectively limiting agency discre-
tion by clarifying traditional equitable principles. And finally, when an
agency’s interpretation of a remedy is too inconsistent with traditional equita-
ble categories to be reined in through the application of equitable principles
as in AMG Capital, the Court seems willing to step in and close off the
agency’s access to certain equitable remedies.
Further, courts’ limiting of agency overreach suggests an underlying
equitable principle at work in the background—equity follows the law.145
Courts appear to be skeptical of the scope of agency powers,146 especially
when an agency overreaches and exploits the agency’s statutory authority.  As
the maxim “equity follows the law” suggests, equity should follow the statute
141 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1950 (2020).
142 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners, supra note 80, at 3.
143 FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 153–61 (3d Cir. 2019).
144 Bray, supra note 20, at 545 (explaining that the “claim for equitable relief is subject
to a stricter ripeness requirement” (emphasis added)).  Mootness similarly seems subject to
a stricter equitable requirement, as courts are especially sensitive to equitable mootness’
potential intrusiveness and demands on courts. See Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. v. Jubber (In re
Paige), 584 F.3d 1327, 1339 (10th Cir. 2009) (providing six factors to consider whether
there is equitable mootness).
145 MEAGHER ET AL., supra note 21, at 73–76.
146 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 47,
47 (1969) (“The history of criticism of the Federal Trade Commission is almost as interest-
ing as the history of the agency itself.”).  See also some of the Justices’ expressed concern
that federal agencies are acting beyond their statutory powers.  Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment at 9, 31, 52, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529), 2017 WL 1399509, at
*9, *31, *52.
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that lays out the agency’s authority, and equity should not overstep those
bounds.  Adopting this maxim for the administrative state, recent federal
courts’ reasoning suggests a new maxim emerging: “equity abhors over-
reach”147—if it looks like an agency is exploiting its statutory authority to do
more than the statute allows, then courts are especially watchful of equitable
remedies.
B. “Neoclassical” Approach to Assessing Agency Discretion
The federal courts’ insistence on traditional equitable principles to
cabin agency overreach reflects a neoclassical approach to administrative
law.148  For example, during the Kokesh oral argument, Justices revealed skep-
ticism that the SEC authorizing statute permits disgorgement.149  Justice
Sotomayor questioned the “authority” for the “basis of disgorgement.”150
Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts noted that “the SEC devised this remedy or
relied on this remedy without any support from Congress.”151  Justice Gor-
such even stated that “there’s no statute governing” disgorgement, and
“[w]e’re just making it up.”152  Given such skepticism of disgorgement, one
might have expected the Justices to join Justice Thomas’s dissent in Liu.  Nev-
ertheless, the majority in Liu held that the statute permits disgorgement.
Instead of categorically removing disgorgement from the agency’s toolkit,
the majority in Liu cabined the remedy with equitable principles.153  Like the
Supreme Court in Liu, the Third Circuit opted for a neoclassical approach in
Shire.  The Third Circuit read the authorizing statute more narrowly than the
agency but cabined only part of the agency’s discretion.  The court limited
the acceptable time frame for the FTC to bring an action, but deliberately
did not define what constitutes the “about to violate the law” requirement,
leaving an area of ambiguity that preserves some of the FTC’s flexibility in
interpreting section 13(b).154  Indeed, the court’s invocation of equitable
principles, yet deliberate retention of areas of ambiguity within those princi-
ples, reveals a particularly measured response to agency overreach that both
seeks to cabin and preserve agency discretion.
Given that agency enforcement powers were largely unchallenged for
the past thirty years, this invites the question why there is now an impulse to
147 Telephone Interview with Samuel L. Bray, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law
School (Dec. 7, 2020) (on file with author).
148 See generally Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discre-
tion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291 (2003) (discussing how courts have used flexi-
ble equitable remedial discretion of the federal courts).  While Levin addresses “equitable
balancing” in a survey of cases, this Note argues that federal courts are using equitable
principles as a targeted tool to strategically shape agency enforcement powers.
149 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 9, 31, 52.
150 Id. at 9.
151 Id. at 31.
152 Id. at 52; see also U.S. Supreme Court to Weigh FTC Restitution Authority, supra note 64.
153 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1950 (2020).
154 See FTC v. Shire ViroPharma, Inc., 917 F.3d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 2019).
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distinguish between law and equity in remedies when evaluating agency stat-
utes.  There are several potential factors animating the courts’ simultaneous
willingness to cabin and commitment to preserve agency enforcement discre-
tion.155  First, as Justice Kagan declared “we’re all textualists now,”156 federal
courts may be less willing to draw larger implications from the plain meaning
of the statute.  Such an emphasis on textualism may no longer be consistent
with the agencies’ formerly broad readings of their authorizing statutes.  Sec-
ond, federal courts may be wary of imposing overly strict limitations on fed-
eral agencies that would incentivize agencies to move their litigation to state
and multistate enforcement actions.  Also, federal courts may be hesitant to
encourage increased litigation in administrative (instead of judicial) courts,
given the potential skepticism underlying administrative law judges—specifi-
cally those appointed outside of Article II.157  Finally, federal courts may be
differentiating between government plaintiffs and private plaintiffs.158  For
instance, courts may have been sympathetic toward government plaintiffs
that act in the public interest to correct wrongs, motivating a broad reading
of implied rights of action in statutes.159  Such sympathy may have been off-
set by a concern for whether both litigants are on equal footing.  For
instance, there may be unfairness in giving agencies large remedial powers
when those agencies are also a litigant.  On balance, while all of these factors
are likely in play, they do not seem to fully account for the recent shift in
federal courts’ approach to cabining agency discretion.
The underlying factor driving the return to traditional equitable princi-
ples appears to be a result of the courts’ effort to preserve yet cabin powerful
agencies—reflecting a neoclassical alternative to evaluating agency enforce-
ment powers.  Professor Pojanowski notes that the neoclassical approach is “a
recognition of the hierarchy of statutory law over judicial doctrine.”160  A
recognition of this hierarchy seems present in the Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to overturn longstanding precedent by adhering to a textualist reading
of the FTC’s authorizing statute in AMG Capital, as well as in the Court’s
155 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
462–502 (1989) (providing a catalogue of interpretive principles for the regulatory state).
156 Harvard Law School, The 2015 Antonin Scalia Lecture Series: A Dialogue with Justice
Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, YOUTUBE (Nov. 25, 2015), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DPEtszFT0Tg.
157 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–56 (2018) (holding that SEC administrative
law judges were unconstitutionally appointed).
158 See the dissent in Credit Bureau Center distinguishing the case from Meghrig v. KFC
W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996), based on Credit Bureau Center involving a government plaintiff
and Meghrig involving a private plaintiff.  FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d 764, 792–94
(7th Cir. 2019) (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
159 See Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
395–97 (2006), encouraging courts to consider the technology that the patent covers, so
that injunctions are not used merely to obtain exorbitant licensing fees or condone other
bad behavior.  This suggests that courts consider the end goal of the remedy, and similar
reasoning may be at play here.
160 Pojanowski, supra note 18, at 857.
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willingness to follow a textualist reading of the SEC’s authorizing statute in
Liu.  A neoclassical approach allows federal courts to guide an agency’s statu-
tory interpretation in traditional ways that equity would permit; indeed, this
approach allows courts to avoid stripping agencies of certain powers by
declaring them unconstitutional or beyond the statute.161  Accordingly, fed-
eral courts both preserve the administrative state and use the legal-equity dis-
tinction in remedies to foreclose the abuse of agency enforcement powers, in
an effort to create a “more appealing allocation of responsibilities between
courts and agencies” characteristic of neoclassical administrative law.162
To do this, courts are using traditional equitable principles to reject judi-
cial deference on legal questions, while still respecting the agencies’ policy
choices.  Indeed, Professor Pojanowski describes neoclassical administrative
law as an approach that “rejects judicial deference on legal questions while
respecting the policy choices that agencies legislate in the discretionary space
Congress has given them.”163  Defining what counts as a remedy in the stat-
ute or clarifying the contours of that remedy is a legal question.  Because
remedies are a matter of law, courts appear willing to weigh in heavily and
clarify the enabling statutes.  Specifically, courts are clarifying that agency
discretion should be channeled through traditional equitable principles.  In
other words, federal courts are instructing agencies to not simply conduct a
plain textual analysis of the applicable statute; rather, agencies must read the
enabling statutes in light of traditional equitable principles.  Agencies retain
discretion—however, that discretion is confined to traditional equitable
principles.
Courts also seem to consider whether there are centralized guidelines or
processes by which agencies seek and obtain equitable remedies.  For
instance, the FTC’s MER Policy Statement represented an era in FTC history
where the agency self-imposed limitations on its discretion.  The MER Policy
Statement featured three factors to determine whether it was appropriate for
the FTC to pursue an equitable remedy.  These self-imposed equitable princi-
ples reduced agency discretion, protecting against the abuse of equitable
remedies.  The withdrawal of these self-imposed limitations marked an inflec-
tion point in the history of the FTC’s use of section 13(b) during which the
agency flexibly interpreted its own statute and aggressively litigated equitable
remedies in federal courts, spurring federal courts to step in and limit agency
enforcement power.  Similarly, during the Kokesh oral argument, Justice
Kagan suggested that the SEC could have itself created at least some gui-
161 Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But see
Daniel Mach, Comment, Rules Without Reasons: The Diminishing Role of Statutory Policy and
Equitable Discretion in the Law of NEPA Remedies, 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 205, 243 (2011)
(highlighting a “conflict of policies: administrative law urges deference to agencies, while
equitable doctrine supports deference to trial court discretion”). See generally John F.
Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1998).
162 Pojanowski, supra note 18, at 857.
163 Id.
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dance for when to use disgorgement.164  For instance, courts may be less
likely to step in if such a broad remedy is not applied depending solely on the
person in charge of the agency at the time.165  This suggests that agencies
may create self-limiting guidelines to seek and obtain equitable remedies that
are more favorable to them than those imposed upon them by federal courts
as a rebuke for their overreach.
CONCLUSION
This Note has argued that the Supreme Court is updating the scope of
agency enforcement powers according to two broader trends in its jurispru-
dence: first, its increasing law-equity distinction in remedies, and second, its
neoclassical approach to administrative law by insisting on equitable princi-
ples to both cabin agency power and preserve the administrative state.  While
the SEC’s expansive reading of “equitable relief” to obtain disgorgement was
rarely challenged for thirty years, the Court severely narrowed SEC discretion
in Kokesh and Liu.  The Court cabined SEC discretion by clarifying that tradi-
tional equitable principles constrain what the SEC may seek in federal courts.
Likewise, the FTC’s broad discretion in using restitution and disgorgement
continued unabated for the past four decades, until the Third and Seventh
Circuit limited FTC discretion in using these particular equitable remedies.
In AMG Capital, the Court similarly favored a traditional understanding of
equitable remedies and, thus, held that the FTC overstepped the bounds of
equity in pursuing restitution and disgorgement.  In both the SEC and FTC
cases, federal courts appear willing to limit agency enforcement powers, but
also hesitant to categorically take away certain remedies from an agency’s
toolkit.  The courts’ insistence on traditional equitable principles to curtail
agency overreach reflects a neoclassical alternative to administrative law that
cabins agency power while preserving the administrative state.  The federal
courts’ treatment of SEC and FTC statutes is instructive of the courts’
approach to agency discretion and interpretation of statutes generally, partic-
ularly given the Court’s increasing move toward textualism.
164 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 146, at 30.
165 Cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 260 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting that the distinction between an officer versus head of the agency factors into the
interpretation question).
